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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-A Narrow Victory for the
Press-Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
In Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court,1 the
United States Supreme Court determined that a Massachusetts
statute2 which had been construed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court 3 as requiring trial closure when victims under eigh-
teen testified in cases of rape or other sexual assault, was in viola-
tion of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Boston Globe
sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts after its reporters were barred from the
courtroom during the trial of a defendant charged with the rape of
three girls-two who were sixteen years of age and one who was
seventeen. The justice denied the request for injunctive relief and
Globe appealed to the full court. It was not until nine months af-
ter the conclusion of the trial that the Supreme Judicial Court
finally dismissed the appeal. While the court agreed with the
newspaper that the closure statute, § 16A, did not require exclu-
sion of the press from the entire criminal trial, it concluded that
the statute did require the closure of sex-offense trials during the
testimony of minor victims in order to encourage these young vic-
tims to come forward and to preserve their ability to testify by
protecting them from psychological harm at the trial.4 During
other portions of such trials, closure to the press and public was
"a matter within the judge's sound discretion."' The court re-
frained from considering the Globe's contentions that the first and
sixth amendments gave the newspaper a right to attend the entire
criminal trial, indicating it would await the outcome of Richmond
1. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1980) which provides:
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal
abuse, or other involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of
age is the person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to
have been committed, . . . the presiding justice shall exclude the gen-
eral public from the courtroom, admitting only such persons as may
have a direct interest in the case.
3. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980).
4. Id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369.
5. Id. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371.
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Newspapers, Inc. v. VirginiaO which was then pending in the
United States Supreme Court. Following the decision in Rich-
mond Newspapers, the Globe made its appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Court vacated the judgment of the Supreme Judicial
Court and remanded the case for further consideration based on
its recent holding in Richmond Newspapers."
The Supreme Judicial Court confirmed its earlier construc-
tion of § 16A, and then considered whether Richmond Newspa-
pers invalidated the mandatory closure rule of the statute.' The
court considered the first amendment issue9 and conceded that
there was "an unbroken tradition of openness" in criminal trials.10
It noted an exception, however, for closure of portions of trials
involving sexual assaults." The court reiterated that § 16A's
mandatory closure rule furthered genuine state interests which it
had previously identified. 2 These interests "would be defeated if a
case-by-case determination were used."' 3 The court did not think
"that Richmond Newspapers require[d] the invalidation of the
[mandatory closure] requirement, given the statute's narrow scope
in an area of traditional sensitivity to the needs of victims."" The
court dismissed Globe's appeal and the newspaper sought further
review in the Supreme Court. The Court reversed and held that §
16A's mandatory closure rule violated the first amendment.
MAJORITY OPINION
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that the press and public have a right of access to crimi-
nal trials under the first and fourteenth amendments:' 5 "[a]bsent
an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a crimi-
nal case must be open to the public."' 6 In that case Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall asserted that the mere agreement of the trial
judge and the parties, standing alone, could not close a trial to the
6. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
7. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 449 U.S. 894 (1980).
8. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 383 Mass. 838, 423 N.E.2d 773 (1981).
9. Id. at 842, 423 N.E.2d at 776. The court did not consider Globe's sixth amend-
ment argument because that amendment preserves "personal rights" that, "at least in the
context of this case, [could] only be asserted by the original criminal defendant." Id.
10. Id. at 845, 423 N.E.2d at 778.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 848, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 851, 423 N.E.2d at 781.
15. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
16. Id. at 581.
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public.17 Although the first and fourteenth amendments give the
press and public a right of access to trials, Justice Stewart cau-
tioned that this right may at times be justifiably restricted. 8 Jus-
tice Blackmun believed public access to trials was protected by the
first amendment. 9 Justice Powell in Gannett v. DePasquale" had
also noted the press' right of access to the criminal justice system
under the first and fourteenth amendments. 1 In Gannett, mem-
bers of the press were excluded from a pretrial suppression
hearing.2
In Globe Newspaper the Court reiterated its previous holding
that the states may not foreclose the exercise of first amendment
rights even though certain activities are not explicitly afforded
protection." "[T]he Court has acknowledged that certain unar-
ticulated rights are implicit in enumerated guarantees . . .these
important but unarticulated rights have none the less been found
to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guaran-
tees." '24 In fact, fear that enumerating specific rights might fore-
close the protection of other important rights that were not ex-
plicit in the Constitution threatened the adoption of the Bill of
Rights. 26 The Court in Richmond Newspapers listed several pre-
cious, though unenumerated, rights which share constitutional
protection .6
The major purpose of the first amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs. The press "was designed
to serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by govern-
mental officials and as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping
17. Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
21. Id. at 397 & n.] (Powell, J., concurring).
22. 443 U.S. at 368.
23. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); See also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). "We need not, in order to find constitutional
protection for the kind of . . . activity disclosed by this record, . . . subsume each activity
under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly." NAACP,
371 U.S. at 430.
24. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 579-80 (plurality opinion).
25, Id. at 579.
26. Id. at 579-80; see also Id. at 580 n.16; Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503
(1976) (presumption of innocence); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966) (right to
interstate travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right of association).
27. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604, quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966).
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officials elected by the people responsible to all the people whom
they were selected to serve."2
This protection guarantees that citizens can participate in
and contribute to their own self-government.2 9 The safeguarding
of the fundamental personal rights of freedom of speech and of
the press "to the ends that men may speak on matters vital to
them and that falsehoods may be exposed through the processes of
education and discussion is essential to free government."30 The
freedoms of speech, of the press, and of the right of people to
assemble and petition the government for the redress of grievances
assure free communication on matters relating to government."1
One such governmental matter is the way in which criminal trials
are conducted. By embracing a right of access to criminal trials,
the first amendment ensures an informed "discussion of govern-
mental affairs."
32
The historical evidence shows that at the time when the Con-
stitution was adopted, "criminal trials both here and in England
had long been presumptively open." ' This openness assured those
concerned that the proceedings were conducted fairly;s4 in fact,
"it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and deci-
sions based on secret bias or partiality. 385 English philosopher Jer-
emy Bentham wrote:
[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison
of publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, ap-
peal, whatever other institutions might present themselves in the
character of checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than
checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in appearance.""
The Court found no record of a closed criminal trial in England
since the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, a  and
28. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219.
29. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604; See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
95 (1940).
30. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95.
31. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575 (plurality opinion).
32. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05.
33. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
569 (plurality opinion)).
34. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion).
35. Id.
36. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948) (quoting 1 J. BENTHA , RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1927)).
37. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266.
The court consisted of the privy council, the common-law judges, and (it
seems) all peers of parliament. In the reign of Henry VIII and his successors,
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there is dispute as to whether even that court convicted people in
secrecy.38 Furthermore the Court emphasized in In re Oliver that
it was "unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial con-
ducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court in the
history of this country."3  Possible exceptions mentioned by the
Court to this unbroken history were cases within the jurisdiction
of courts martial and juvenile proceedings."'
The superior court in Globe Newspaper argued that trials
were historically not always open to the press and public during
the testimony of minor sex crime victims.41 But Justice Brennan
stressed that any restrictions on the right of access to a portion of
a criminal trial, "such as a murder trial . . . or a rape trial, [de-
pend] not on the historical openness of that type of criminal trial,
but rather on the state interests assertedly supporting the
restriction."4 2
Public scrutiny benefits the defendant, the judicial process,
and government generally.43 For example, publicizing trial pro-
ceedings contributes to the fact-finding process.4 4 This is because
the trial may, through publicity, come to the attention of impor-
tant witnesses willing to come forward voluntarily with their testi-
mony.45 "[O]pen examination of witnesses viva voce, in the pres-
ence of all mankind, is much more conducive to clearing up of
truth, than the private and secret examination . . .-.
The actual presence of the public at a trial furthers particular
public purposes in a way that cannot be approximated by the
mere reproduction of a "'cold' record.' 7 Open trials educate.48
"The victim of the crime, the family of the victim, others who
the jurisdiction of the court was illegally extended to such a degree (espe-
cially in punishing disobedience to the king's arbitrary proclamations) that it
became odious to the nation, and was abolished.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
38. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 266 n.12. Speaking of juvenile court proceedings the Court noted: "[T]hey
are often conducted without admitting all the public. But it has never been the practice
wholly to exclude parents, relatives, and friends, or to refuse juveniles the right to counsel."
Id.
41. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 n.13.
42. Id.
43. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
44. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596 (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270 n.24.
46. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 373).
47. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 & n.22.
48. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 428.
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have suffered similarly, or others accused of like crimes have an
interest in observing the course of a prosecution." 49 The operation
and administration of the criminal justice system, and the per-
formance of judges, prosecutors and the police are of interest to
all citizens." Open trials are main sources of such information. 5 1
Public access promotes integrity and fosters public respect for
the judicial process .5  Because every criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous public scrutiny, the possibility of judicial abuse
of power is reduced.5 Jeremy Bentham wrote:
[Sluppose that the proceedings be completely secret, and the court,
on the occasion, to consist of no more than a single judge-that
judge will be at once indolent and arbitrary: how corrupt soever his
inclination may be, it will find no check, at any rate no tolerably
efficient check to oppose it."
Public trials have long been acknowledged as therapeutic.
55
People sensed that the means used to achieve criminal justice
must have public support for both the results and the process.56
Society "cannot erase from people's consciousness the fundamen-
tal, natural yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for ret-
ribution. ' 57 If a trial has been concealed from the public view,
and the disposition appears improper, 58 such a result can foster a
sense "that the system at best has failed and at worst has been
corrupted. '59 Justice must have the appearance of justice,6" for if
a society based on ordered liberty is to survive and flourish, its
citizens must be convinced that they are governed fairly."' A ma-
jor function of an open trial is to demonstrate this fairness.62 Open
trials assure the public that rights are respected and that justice is
dispensed equally, whereas closed trials "breed suspicion of




52. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
53. Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270.
54. Id. at 271 (quoting BENTHAM, supra note 36, at 524).
55. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570 (plurality opinion).




60. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
61. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 594 (Brennan, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 595.
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the law."' 3 Even hearings, though they be fair, are suspect if held
in secret.64 "Public confidence cannot long be maintained where
important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and
then announced in conclusive terms to the public, with the record
supporting the court's decision sealed from public view.""'
The right of access to criminal trials is not, however, abso-
lute. 6 As a government may fix reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions upon the use of its streets, so may a trial judge
limit access to a trial in the interest of justice. 7 "[Tjhe question
in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to
unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities for the communica-
tion of thought and discussion of public questions immediately as-
sociated with resort to public places.""
Circumstances warranting exclusion are limited, however,
and the state has the burden of justifying trial closure.69 Denying
the right of access requires a showing that "the denial is necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest."'"
In Globe Newspaper, the Court reduced the state's interest to
two: 1) protecting minor sex crime victims from further trauma
and embarrassment and 2) encouraging victims to come forward
and testify truthfully. 71 While the Court agreed that the first in-
terest was compelling 72 and stressed that "the measure of the
State's interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are
injured by testifying, but rather the incremental injury suffered by
testifying in the presence of the press and general public,"'7' this
63. Id,
64. United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3rd Cir. 1978).
65. Id.
66. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
67. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion).
68. Id.; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
69. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
70. Id. See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982) (State sought to
restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters. The Court held in such a
case the first amendment required that the restriction be demonstrably supported not only
by a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operates with-
out unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("[l]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information
about a matter of public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest
order."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. at 438 ("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free
expression are suspect . . . .Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.").
71. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607.
72. Id.
73. Id. n. 19.
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interest could not justify a mandatory closure rule."4 Because the
circumstances of a particular case may impact upon the signifi-
cance of that interest, the trial court should determine in each
case whether closure is really necessary to protect the minor vic-
tim. 75 Among the appropriate factors to be considered by the
court "are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and un-
derstanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and
the interests of the parents and relatives. '7'  By requiring a
mandatory closure, the legislature of Massachusetts had imputed
findings justifying closure." The applicability of such legislative
findings in every case, however, cannot be assured.
78
If, for example the minor victim did not object to the trial being
public during his or her testimony and the defendant wanted the
entire trial to be public, or, to make the case perhaps even stronger,
if the minor victim wanted the public to know precisely what a hei-
nous crime the defendant had committed, the imputed legislative
justifications for requiring the closure of the trial during the victim's
testimony, would in part, at least, be inapplicable.
7 9
Other states have statutes or constitutions that provide for
judicial discretion to close a criminal trial during the testimony of
minor sex offense victims.8 In contrast to Massachusetts' § 16A,
74. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
75. Id. See also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. "Absent an overriding
interest articulated in the findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."
Id.
76. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.




80. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608 n.22; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-202
(1975) ("[Tlhe court may, in its discretion, exclude from the courtroom all persons, except
such as may be necessary in the conduct of the trial."); ARZ. R. CRIM. P. 9.3 (1973)
("The court may, in its discretion, exclude all spectators except representatives of the press
during the testimony of a witness."); FLA. STAT. § 918.16 (Supp. 1982) ("[Tihe court shall
clear the courtroom of all persons except parties to the cause . . . newspaper reporters or
broadcasters .... "); GA. CODE § 81-1006 (1956 Rev.) ("[Tihe presiding judge shall have
the right, in his discretion . . . to hear and try the said case after clearing of the court-
room."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:469.1 (1981) ("The Court, . . . may order that the
testimony of such victim be heard in closed session of court or in the judge's chambers; in
the presence of . . . a reasonable but limited number of members of the public which the
court may allow in its discretion under these circumstances, and any other party which the
court determines has a valid interest in the proceedings."); Miss. CONST., art. 3 § 26
("[Tihe court may, in its discretion, exclude from the courtroom all persons except such as
are necessary in the conduct of the trial."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 632-A:8 (Supp. 1979)
("The victim's testimony shall be heard in camera unless good cause is shown by the defen-
dant."); N.Y. JuD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1982) ("[Tlhe court may, in its discretion, ex-
clude therefrom all who are not directly interested therein."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166
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no other state has a mandatory provision excluding both the press
and the public during such testimony.8 Even if the victim does
not seek exclusion and would not be injured by the presence of the
press and the public, § 16A requires closure. 82
In Globe Newspaper, the names of the minor victims were in
the public record and there was some indication that the girls may
have been willing to testify despite the presence of the press in the
courtroom.8" Government may not impose sanctions for publica-
tion of the names of rape victims obtained from public record,84
and in this case, the prosecuting attorney informed the judge after
the trial began that she had spoken to the girls regarding the
press.85 According to the prosecutor, the girls "wouldn't object to
the press being included" if "it were at all possible to obtain a
guarantee" that the press would not attempt to interview them, or
publish their names, photographs, or any personal information.8"
The Supreme Judicial Court had itself recognized that § 16A as it
stood was only a partial solution toward giving more complete
protection to minor victims of sexual assaults, since victims'
names were not part of a closed record. 87 In the particular case
before the Supreme Court, closure might not have seemed neces-
sary if the trial court had been able to exercise discretion.88 Ac-
cording to the Court, Massachusetts' legitimate concern for the
well-being of minor victims could have been served by permitting
the trial court to determine whether the circumstances in the case
warranted closure.89 It followed that § 16A's mandatory closure
provision could not be deemed a narrowly tailored means of ac-
(Supp. 1981) ("[Tlhe trial judge may, during the taking of testimony of the prosecutrix,
exclude from the courtroom all persons except . .. those engaged in the trial of the
case."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-02 (1974) ("[Tlhe presiding judge or justice, in his
discretion, may exclude therefrom all persons not necessarily present as parties or wit-
nesses."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953) ("[Tlhe court may, in its discretion exclude
all persons who are not directly interested therein."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1901
(1953) ("[Tlhe presiding judge or justice shall exclude therefrom all minors, unless neces-
sarily present as parties or witnesses, and in his discretion may exclude all persons not so
present."); WIs. STAT. § 970.03(4) (Supp. 1982) ("ITlhe judge shall, at the request of the
complaining witness, exclude from the hearing all persons not officers of the court, .. the
judge may exclude all such persons from the hearing in any case .
81. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608 n.22.
82. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
83. Id., at 608-09.
84. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
85. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 600 n.5.
86. Id. at 600 n.5.
87. Globe Newspaper, 379 Mass. at 849, 423 N.E.2d at 780.
88. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609.
89. Id.
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comodating Massachusetts' interest. 0
If the trial court makes an individualized determination that
closure is necessary to protect the state's interests, representatives
of the press and public must still be given an opportunity to be
heard regarding their exclusion.91 The trial court could still pro-
tect the minor victim by denying these representatives access to
the sensitive details concerning the victim's future testimony. 92
Judges traditionally have had the discretion to impose reasonable
restrictions upon courtroom behavior in the interests of decorum
and had the ability to conduct conferences in chambers.9
The Court also refused to accept Massachusetts' second as-
serted interest-that of encouraging minor victims of sex crimes
to come forward and provide accurate testimony-as justification
for § 16A's mandatory closure requirement.94 In particular, the
Court noted a lack of empirical support for the claim that § 16A's
closure rule actually achieved that interest.95 The Court also
found speculative the suggestion that the statute improved the
quality or credibility of testimony.96 Even if such were the situa-
tion in a particular case, the general presumption is that openness
may improve the quality of testimony.97 "In the absence of any
showing that closure would improve the quality of testimony of all
minor sex victims, the state's interest certainly cannot justify a
mandatory closure rule." 98
The Court also attacked the second asserted state interest
from the standpoint of logic and common sense.99 If the interest
depended upon keeping the substance of the minor victim's testi-
90. Id.
91. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25 (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at 401
(Powell, J., concurring)).
92. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609 n.25.
93. Id.; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 598 n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 609.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 609 n.26.
97. Id. (quoting Gannett, 443 U.S. at 383 (plurality opinion)); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 583 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Clearly the openness of the proceedings provides other benefits as well: it
arguably improves the quality of the testimony, it may induce unknown wit-
nesses to come forward with relevant testimony, it may move all trial partici-
pants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and it gives the public the
opportunity to observe the courts in the performance of their duties and to
determine whether they are performing adequately. (footnote omitted).
Id.
98. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610 n.26.
99. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610.
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mony as well as his or her identity secret, § 16A was ineffective. 00
"[Tihe press [was] not denied access to the transcript, court per-
sonnel, or any other possible source that could [have] provide[d]
an account of the minor victim's testimony .. ". . " Assuming
arguendo that § 16A advanced the state's interest of encouraging
minor sex victims to come forward and testify accurately, it was
doubtful, in the Court's opinion, that such an interest could with-
stand constitutional attack. 10 2 The Court suggested a domino.ef-
fect, indicating that the same interest could be asserted to support
more mandatory closure rules designed to encourage victims to
come forward.' 3 "Surely it cannot be suggested that minor vic-
tims of sex crimes are the only crime victims who, because of pub-
licity attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward
and testify."' 04
Massachusetts' asserted interests failed to justify the
mandatory closure provision of § 16A and left the statute standing
in contradiction to the right of access recognized in Richmond
Newspapers. °5 Nonetheless, the Court specifically emphasized
that the holding did not preclude exclusion of the press and gen-
eral public during the testimony of minor victims of sex crimes in
individual cases and under appropriate circumstances; but a
mandatory closure was unconstitutional.10 6
DISSENT
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented,
asserting that the Massachusetts statute "[had] a relatively minor
incidental impact on First Amendment rights and [gave] effect to
the overriding state interest in protecting child rape victims.'
07
Suggesting misplaced priorities, Chief Justice Burger attacked the





104. Id.; See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion) ("[A] pre-
sumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of
justice."); See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966) (quoting Oliver, 333
U.S. at 268) ("The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long
been reflected in the 'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.' "); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is
public property.").
105. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610-11 & n.27.
106. Id. at 611 n.27.
107. Id. at 619-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ted to require closure of all trial proceedings in order to protect
minors charged with a sex offense, 108 but are not permitted to
mandate the closure of a portion of a trial to protect the minor
victims of sex offense crimes. 09 The Chief Justice interpreted the
Court's narrow holding as not foreclosing the authority of the
state to enact "more narrowly drawn statutes" which would per-
mit the trial court in its discretion to exclude the press and gen-
eral public during the testimony of a minor victim; 0 nor could
the Court's narrow holding prevent enactment of a statute which
mandated "closure except in cases where the victim agrees to tes-
tify in open court." ' Considering the victims in Globe Newspa-
per in light of this latter interpretation, the Chief Justice did not
believe the girls had consented to testifying in open court." 2
The Court's apparent interpretation of the holding in Rich-
mond Newspapers as spelling out a first amendment right to ac-
cess under all circumstances was "plainly incorrect." 1 3 The Chief
Justice believed that Justice Brennan's approach to determining
right of access was proper: "[Rlesolution of the first amendment
public access claims in individual cases must be strongly influ-
enced by the weight of historical practice and by an assessment of
the specific structural value of the public access in the
circumstances."
114
108. Id. at 612. "Historically our society has gone to great lengths to protect minors
charged with crime, particularly by prohibiting the release of the names of offenders, bar-




I11. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. n.l.
Each of [the three victims] indicated that they had the same concerns
and basically they are privacy concerns.
The difficulty of obtaining any kind of guarantee that the press would
not print their names or where they go to school or any personal data or take
pictures of them or attempt to interview them, those concerns come from
their own privacy interests, as well as the fact that there are grandparents
involved with a couple of these victims who do not know what happened and
if they were to find out by reading the paper, everyone was concerned about
what would happen then. And they stated that if it were at all possible to
obtain a guarantee that this information would not be used, then they
wouldn't object to the press being included. I explained that that is [a] very
difficult guarantee to obtain because the Court cannot issue a conditional
order, or anything like that, but I just wanted to put on the record what their
concerns were and what they are afraid of.
Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 48a).
113. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
114. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Regarding the weight of historical practice, there is "a long
history of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual as-
saults, particularly those against minors."11 5 Furthermore, several
115. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); See. e.g., Harris
v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967). The court
described the victim as a twenty-three year old virgin who was shot, raped four times by a
syphilitic and his confederate, and left naked on a sparsely inhabited country road in near
freezing weather. The court in Harris stated that the closing of the courtroom to spectators
was a "frequent and accepted practice when the lurid details must be related by a young
lady." Id. at 891; Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913).
The constitutional provision for a public trial should be construed in a
reasonable sense, and in view of the object thereby intended to be subserved.
The mere denial of the literal right should not be held ground for reversing a
judgment, unless it can be perceived that the defendant has been deprived of
some benefit or advantage thereby.
The ...only conceivable benefit that the defendant might be deprived
of by the order of the court in this case was the presence in the courtroom of
a crowd of idle, gaping loafers, whose morbid curiosity would lead them to
attend such a trial, and the consequent embarassment and annoyance their
presence might cause to the unfortunate girl [eight years old] was called
upon to testify to the story of the defendants crime and her shame. Of the
deprival of that benefit the defendant has no legal ground to complain.
Id. at 490. See also United States v. Guise, 158 F. Supp. 821 (D. Alaska 1958), aff'd, 262
F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959).
[TIhe excluding of spectators in a prosecution for statutory rape in which the
prosecuting witness is of a tender age [ten years old] has been held proper, in
the discretion of the court, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
...the term 'public' is a relative one, and its construction depends on
various conditions and circumstances ....
Id. at 824. See also Guise v. United States, 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958). The reason for
the exclusion order was that in view of the tender years of the prosecutrix and another
witness and the difficulty of obtaining their testimony before a large audience, the district
court thought the exclusion was in furtherance of justice. The Ninth Circuit held that the
exclusion was a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. Id. at 157; Hogan v. State,
191 Ark. 437, 86 S.W. 2d 931 (1935). In supporting the trial court's exclusion order, the
Supreme Court of Arkansas commented:
It was apparent to the court and to everyone else in the courtroom that she
[ten year old prosecuting witness] was terribly frightened and embarrassed to
have to go up on the witness stand in the presence of a courtroom crowded
with people and give testimony that must have been embarrassing and humil-
iating to her in a high degree.
Id. at 439. See also State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7 (1933).
In view of the nature of the case and the age of the prosecutrix [thirteen
years old], her embarrassment and disturbance are readily understandable.
Under all the circumstances here appearing, we do not think the court
abused its discretion or committed prejudicial error by its ruling, or deprived
appellant of a public trial within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
Id. at 10. See also State v. Purvis, 157 Conn. 198, 251 A.2d 178 (1968).
The young witness [sixteen years old] was called upon to testify to all the
sordid details of a particularly revolting rape. Under the circumstances the
temporary and limited exclusion of the general public other than representa-
tives of the public press was permissible and did not deny the defendant his
1983]
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states have statutory provisions allowing for closure of sex-offense
cases involving minor victims."' 6 Chief Justice Burger concluded,
therefore, that the historical record regarding cases involving sex-
ual abuse of minors simply did not represent an "unbroken, un-
contradicted history" of open proceedings." 7 The presumption of
openness based on a history of openness relied on in Richmond
Newspapers thus gave no support to the proposition in Globe
Newspaper that closing a trial during the testimony of a minor
victim violated the first amendment.1"8
The Chief Justice also took issue with the Court's mandate
that Massachusetts show that the denial of access was necessi-
tated by a compelling governmental interest and that § 16A was
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 9 "The Court's wooden
application of the rigid standard it asserts for this case is
inappropriate." 2 '
Massachusetts did not deny the press or public access to in-
formation such as the trial transcript or information that was part
of the public record such as the victim's name.1 2' Nor did the
state inhibit the disclosure of information.1 22 The case was not one
involving unconstitutional statutes preventing "the dissemination
of information or the public discussion of ideas. '"123
right to a 'public trial.'
Id. at 182. See also Moore v. State, 151 Ga. 648, 108 S.E. 47 (1921), appeal dismissed,
260 U.S. 702 (1922). In his motion to clear the courtroom, the special counsel for the
prosecution stated:
We are making this request due to the extreme youth of this young woman
[sixteen years old], and our information both from her people and physicians
as to her extremely nervous state; and we deem it almost essential, in order
that she may go through with this investigation that the public be excused.
Id. at 651.
116. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see supra note
80. See, e.g., ALA. CONST., art. VI, § 169 (1901) (repealed, 1973) ("[T]he court may in its
discretion, exclude from the courtroom all persons, except such as may be necessary to
conduct the trial."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.16 (1979) (any person under the age of six-
teen); GA. CODE § 81-1006 (1978) (not limited to minors); Miss. CONST., art. 3, § 26 (not
limited to minors); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:8 (Supp. 1981) (in cases where the
victim is under sixteen years of age); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1982) (not limited to
minors); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-166 (Supp. 1981) (not limited to minors); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-7-4 (1953) (not limited to minors).
117. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Rich-
mond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573 (plurality opinion)).
118. Globe Newspaper, 457 U. S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).




123. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 615 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); See, e.g., Brown
v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1981) (The state sought to restrict directly the offer of ideas to
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The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had identified
the state's interests as follows:
1) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute com-
plaints and give testimony ... ; 2) to protect minor victims of cer-
tain sex crimes from public degradation, humiliation, demoraliza-
tion, and psychological damage...; 3) to enhance the likelihood of
credible testimony from such minors, free of confusion, fright, or
embellishment; 4) to promote the sound and orderly administration
of justice...; 5) to preserve evidence and obtain just convictions.'24
"Neither the purpose of the law nor its effect is primarily to
deny the press or public access to information; the verbatim tran-
script is made available to the public and media and may be used
without limit."' 28 Since neither the purpose nor the effect of §
16A denied access, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the next
step was to ascertain whether the restrictions contained in the
statute were reasonable and whether the state's interests overrode
"the very incidental effects of the law of first amendment
rights."'2 6 He perceived the Court's duty as that of balancing the
voters.); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (The state sought to
impose penal sanctions for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information regarding the
name of a youth charged as a juvenile offender without first obtaining approval of juvenile
court.); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (The state
sought to impose a criminal sanction on third persons who were strangers to the inquiry,
including news media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confiden-
tial proceedings of Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.); Nebraska Press Assoc. v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (The state sought to restrain news media from publishing or
broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions made by accused to law enforcement
officers or third parties and other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely
reported murder of six persons.); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)
(The state sought to impose sanctions on the accurate publication of rape victims' names
obtained from judicial records that were maintained in connection ivith a public prosecu-
tion and were themselves open to public inspection.); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (The state sought to prohibit the activities of the NAACP in advising potential
litigants of their legal rights and referring them to attorneys; the court held these activities
to be modes of expression and association.).
124. Globe Newspaper, 383 Mass. at 847-48, 423 N.E.2d at 779.
125. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id.; See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Stewart pointed out that just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions on the exercise of first amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge im-
pose reasonable limitations upon the unrestricted occupation of the courtroom by represent-
atives of the press and members of the public. Justice Stewart also noted: "Moreover, every
courtroom has a finite physical capacity, and there have been occasions when not all who
wish to attend a trial may do so."; Id. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 355 (1966) (Arrangements
made by the judge with the news media caused Sheppard to be deprived of the "judicial
serenity and calm to which he is entitled." Bedlam reigned at the courthouse and newsmen
took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial,
including Sheppard.); Id. at 358 (The carnival atmosphere at the trial could easily have
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interests of the press for access against the interests of the state in
shielding minor rape victims from "the trauma of public
testimony." '127
The interest of the press and public in actually being present
in the courtroom during testimony was minimal in light of their
complete access to all the victim's testimony.128 And, since the
majority admitted that Massachusetts' interest in protecting the
victimized child was a compelling one, the test of Richmond
Newspapers was met.' 29 So long as the state's interest overrode §
16A's impact on first amendment rights and the limitations on ac-
cess furthered the state's interests, the statute "need not be pre-
cisely tailored." '
Mandatory closure during only the actual testimony of the
minor victim rationally served Massachusetts' overriding interest
in protecting these children from undisputed psychological dam-
age."' The Chief Justice also viewed the law as a rational re-
sponse to another undisputed problem-the underreporting of
rapes and sexual offenses. He criticized the Court for rejecting the
state's claim as empirically speculative and open to challenge as a
matter of logic and common sense.132 Empirical evidence could
only be produced by allowing the state to experiment;' 33 and the
Court's conclusion, that Massachusetts' argument that § 16A
might reduce underreporting of sexual offenses was illogical,
been avoided since the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the
court.).
127. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion) ("Absent an over-
riding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public.").
130. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 616 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 616-17.
132. Id. at 617.
133. Id.; see, e.g., Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1981) (The Court held
that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from experimenting with a program such as
that authorized by a Florida statutory provision permitting electronic media and still pho-
tography coverage of judicial proceedings.); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441
(1980) (South Dakota's policy in confining sale of cement produced by a state-owned ce-
ment plant to state residents during a time of shortage did not violate the commerce clause.
The Court emphasized that to hold otherwise "would interfere significantly with a state's
ability to structure relations exclusively with its own citizens. It would also threaten the
future fashioning of effective and creative programs for solving local problems and distrib-
uting government largesse."); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 & n.20 (1977); New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment. We may strike down the statute which
embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious or




demonstrated "a misperception of the Commonwealth's argument
and an overly narrow view of the protection the statute seeks to
afford young victims."' 3 The statute was never intended to pre-
serve confidentiality; its aim was to avoid the risk of psychological
damage caused by relating the sensitive details of the offense
before a crowd.
135
The Chief Justice supported the mandatory nature of the clo-
sure statute as clearly furthering the state's interests. 13 He ex-
pressed faith that if the law were discretionary, most judges would
exercise their discretion soundly, avoiding needless trauma to the
victim; however, he also supported the legislature's position of not
leaving "the closure determination to the idiosyncrasies of individ-
ual judges" who may be easily pressured by the media.' 37
Victims and their families, he asserted, are entitled to the
protection the mandatory closure statute provides; the mere possi-
bility of public testimony may deter some parents and children
from reporting serious crimes. 38 Psychologists report that the
trauma of testifying in open court nearly approximates that exper-
ienced from the crime itself.139 A state should, within reason, be
permitted to mitigate such trauma.14 0 The Chief Justice suggested
that a mandatory closure rule would also alleviate confusion
among victims and their parents who might not understand state
law provisions for court discretion and might be deterred from re-
porting a crime because they believe public testimony will be
necessary."'
The presumption of openness in a criminal trial is not irrebut-
table. 1, In Justice Stewart's separate opinion in Richmond News-
papers, he recognized that exclusion may be justified: "This is not
to say that only constitutional considerations can justify such re-
strictions . . . . [T]he sensibilities of a youthful prosecution wit-
ness, for example, might justify .. .exclusion in a criminal trial
for rape, so long as the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
public trial were not impaired.""' 3 Other members of the Court
134. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 617 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 618.
136. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 618 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 618-19.





143. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2nd Cir. 1974) "It is inter-
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also suggested their willingness to support a justified exclusion.",
In the opinion of Chief Justice Burger, the mandatory closure
statute gave effect to an overriding interest in protecting minor
rape victims while having only an incidental effect on first amend-
ment rights. 1"5
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Commentators have noted that while the closing of the court-
room to the press and public has been a rare event in the history
of our nation, during the last five years closure motions and orders
have been commonplace. 4 The Burger Court's decisions have
meant serious defeats for the press in major constitutional
battles.
1 47
The two most recent Court cases decided prior to Globe
Newspaper were Gannett, upholding the closure of a pre-trial
hearing based on the sixth amendment, which was interpreted as
not providing to the press and public a right to attend independent
of that of the accused, and Richmond Newspapers, overturning
the closure of a trial based on the first amendment, which was
found to provide "the requisite right of attendance to the press
and general public."' 48 Although Richmond Newspapers repre-
sented a departure from what appeared to be the Court's practice
on condoning closures, " 9 and thus representing a major victory
for the press,1 50 the Court has been severely criticized by commen-
tators for its failure to respond to a number of related issues in
general, and in particular for its failure to articulate for the lower
esting that the right to public trial has also been limited on occasion to favor an interest
held not by the defendant, but by a private individual." Id. at 540. The court gave the
example of the recognized need "to protect young complaining witnesses in rape cases
against embarrassment, harrassment, and loss of reputation . . . . [which] will suffice to
invoke the shelter of limited privacy upon criminal proceedings." Id.
144. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he trial
judge made no findings to support closure."); Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
Court has implied that any restriction on access to information, no matter how severe and
no matter how unjustified, would be constitutionally acceptable so long as it did not single
out the press for special disabilities not applicable to the public at large."); Id. at 598
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("What countervailing interests might be sufficient to reverse this
presumption of openness need not concern us now.").
145. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 619-20 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
146. Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, Some Observations on the Swinging Courthouse
Doors of Gannett and Richmond Newspapers, 59 DEN. L.J. 721 (1982).
147. Note, Richmond Newspapers: A Public Right to Attend Civil Trials? 4
COMM./ENT. L.J. 291 & n.7 (1981-82).
148. Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, supra note 147, at 721.




courts a set of standards that would justify closure.15 Globe
Newspaper was arguably a case arising out of these alleged fail-
ings of the Court.1 51 Justice Wilkins of the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court was not certain that "the mandatory closing
of the trial of a case involving a minor victim of a sex crime dur-
ing his or her testimony, as the court directs, is constitutionally
permissible without specific findings by the judge that the closing
is justified by overriding or countervailing interests of the
Commonwealth. 15 3
Unfortunately, the Court in Globe Newspaper did not take
advantage of its opportunity to "fully examine and define the cir-
cumstances which will allow a trial judge to exclude the public
and press from a trial."' 5 ' Instead, we are left with a narrow hold-
ing-"a rule of mandatory closure respecting the testimony of mi-
nor sex victims is constitutionally infirm"' 55-that has little prece-
151. See, e.g., Switzer, Applying Criticisms of the Warren Court to the Burger
Court: A Case Study of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 203, 228 (1982) ("The decision cursorily explained the derivation of the constitutional
right to attend trials, misused precedent, failed to develop a principle of law for neutral
application, and failed to provide guidance to lower courts when reaching a holding of the
case."); Note, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: A New but Uncertain "Right of
Access," 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 989, 992-93 (1981).
Although Richmond established a right of access to criminal trials, the Court
emphasized that the right was not absolute. The Court failed to articulate a
definitive test to determine what circumstances justify closure, however,
thereby leaving lower courts to determine when closure is constitutionally
permitted. Another important issue raised and left unsettled by Richmond is
whether the first amendment right of access extends beyond the criminal
courtroom to other institutions and sources of information controlled by the
government. Whether the right extends to criminal pretrial proceedings is of
particular interest in light of the Gannett ruling.
Id.; Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, supra note 147, at 721.
How the Court could have spoken with less clarity and given less direction to
lower courts than it did in the the twelve opinions issued in these two cases
(Gannett and Richmond Newspapers) is difficult to imagine . . . .Left un-
decided and very unclear are a number of important issues including the
extent to which this right attaches to various pre-trial and post-trial criminal
proceedings; what, if any, procedural predicates must precede a closure or-
der; and what types and degrees of countervailing interests will justify
closure.
Id.; Note, supra note 148, at 325 ("[M]uch litigation will undoubtedly be required to de-
termine the circumstances under which a judge may still close the courtroom doors to the
public and press.").
152. Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, supra note 147, at 721-22; Note, supra note 148, at
321-22.
153. Globe Newspaper, 383 Mass. at 853, 423 N.E.2d at 782 (Wilkins, J.,
concurring).
154. Note, supra note 148, at 322.
155. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 611 n.27.
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156. Schmidt, Jr. and Schmidt, supra note 147, at 722.
157. Note, supra note 148, at 322.
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